Returns to higher education can reflect either an increase in human capital or job market signalling. In this paper, I isolate the human capital resulting from higher education, capitalizing on a distinctive feature of Norway’s implementation of the Bologna reform. Students who enrolled in 1999 inadvertently acquired more human capital com- pared to those who enrolled in 2000, despite earning identical degrees. This anomaly, two sets of graduates with identical degrees, of which one has more education, allows me to answer a key question concerning investment in higher education. How much does an increase in human capital increase an individuals’ earnings, in the absence of self-selection and signalling? I use rich longitudinal register data to estimate returns to university-acquired human capital. 15-20 years after first enrolling, receiving reform-induced human capital leads to gaining 1.5 percentile ranks in the earnings distribution. This corresponds to a 11 percent wage increase for an additional year of unobserved higher education. Human capital increases long-run earnings potential even when employers cannot observe it directly, but signalling matters when first entering the labor market.
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